The Exclusionary Rule Redux - Again by Weinreb, Lloyd L.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 37 | Number 3 Article 6
2010
The Exclusionary Rule Redux - Again
Lloyd L. Weinreb
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Exclusionary Rule Redux - Again, 37 Fordham Urb. L.J. 873 (2010).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol37/iss3/6
WEINREB_CHRISTENSEN2 6/13/2010 8:44 PM 
 
873 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE REDUX—AGAIN 
Lloyd L. Weinreb* 
According to whether one starts counting with Weeks v. United States,1 
decided in 1914, or Mapp v. Ohio,2 decided in 1961, we are closing in on 
fifty or one hundred years since the exclusionary rule was made part of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  One would have thought that there has 
been more than enough time for the Supreme Court to have clarified what 
the rule is about and whether it is worth having.  In broad outline, at any 
rate, the rule is not very complicated: if the police obtain evidence by 
means that violate a person’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, the evi-
dence is not admissible against that person in a criminal trial.  The basic 
provision has been extended to violations of other constitutional rights3 and 
freighted with innumerable epicycles, and epicycles on epicycles, but it is 
at bottom straightforward.  Clarification has not happened.  Instead the ex-
clusionary rule survives in a kind of doctrinal purgatory, neither accepted 
fully into the constitutional canon nor cast into the outer darkness like 
“separate but equal”4 and, in criminal procedure, the right to counsel before 
formal proceedings have begun.5  It survives, but its reach is uncertain, its 
rationale questioned, and its value doubted. 
There has been no shortage of cases in which those issues are presented 
and discussed, usually in conflicting opinions that together leave no argu-
ment unsaid.  It is something of a parlor game—with as much serious con-
sequence—to browse through all that has been written for and against the 
exclusionary rule and extract just those words and phrases that support 
whatever position one has decided to take.  Articles analyzing its constitu-
tional underpinnings, ruminating about its likely effects, or studying its ac-
 
* Dane Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
 1. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 3. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240-41 (1967) (lineups; Sixth Amendment); 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination). 
 4. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954). 
 5. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).  But see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682, 689 (1972). 
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tual effects abound.  Symposia, like this one, flourish.6  Every few years, 
the demise of the rule is reported, but it then turns out that reports of its 
death were exaggerated.  So here we are, at it again, prompted this time by 
two cases that follow the usual pattern but seem to make a more frontal, 
more threatening assault on the rule than we have been accustomed to, and 
so pose, yet again, the question what its future is, or rather, whether it has a 
future. 
In view of the current fashion for behavioral studies of the judiciary, es-
pecially the Supreme Court,7 there may be some temptation to explain the 
Court’s on-again, off-again attitude toward the exclusionary rule as nothing 
more than a consequence of the Court’s shifting membership, hardline lib-
erals and hardline conservatives never gaining more than an incomplete 
and impermanent ascendancy.  There has, certainly, been a marked unwil-
lingness to find the rule’s common ground, perhaps more so or more endu-
ringly so, than about other controversial matters.  But even taking that into 
account, the course of the rule’s jurisprudence is remarkable.  All the more 
so, because it is not a “hot button” issue.  Abolishing the exclusionary 
rule—a possibility, it should be noted, that presumably depends constitu-
tionally on what the Court has from time to time offered as the rule’s ratio-
nale—is regularly proposed, but, despite its detractors’ prophecies of 
gloom and doom, I doubt that the public cares very much either way.  Al-
though carefully phrased questions elicit predictable responses, elections 
are not won or lost over the exclusionary rule.  And, in fact, as the rule is 
now understood and applied, there is little convincing evidence that it 
makes much difference either way.  To a considerable extent, the rule is a 
distinctly legal matter, not political, social, or economic.  It gives us legal 
scholars something to do—keeps us, as it were, off the streets. 
The modern history of the rule begins with Mapp.  But its early history, 
before Mapp, contained a preview of things to come.  The exclusion of evi-
dence was embraced but not wholeheartedly, rejected but not definitively.  
As one would expect, the Court’s opinion in Weeks, where it all began, 
tilted toward the rights-based approach.  It observed that if a person’s prop-
erty could be seized unlawfully and retained for use as evidence against its 
possessor, after an application for its return has been made, 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment . . . is of no value, and, so far as 
those placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitu-
 
 6. This Essay was written as part of the Fordham Urban Law Journal’s Symposium on 
“The Future of the Exclusionary Rule and the Aftereffects of the Herring and Hudson Deci-
sions.” 
 7. For a survey of such studies and commentary on them, see RICHARD A. POSNER, 
HOW JUDGES THINK 19-56 (2008). 
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tion. . . . To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial de-
cision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the 
Constitution . . . .8 
This strong language was weakened inferentially by the Court’s acknowl-
edgment that courts generally did not inquire into the manner in which 
competent evidence was obtained, and that had the illegality of the seizure 
in Weeks not been established before the trial began, precedent dictated that 
the trial not be stopped to resolve that collateral issue and that the evidence 
be admitted.9 
Wolf v. Colorado10 looked the other way, but again, not clearly.  Be-
cause Wolf was a state case and the Fourth Amendment had not yet been 
incorporated into the Due Process Clause, the attention of Justice Frankfur-
ter, who wrote the opinion, was drawn to the latter issue and not to the 
Fourth Amendment itself.  What he said (“stoutly adher[ing]” to Weeks) 
was that the exclusionary rule was not express in the Fourth Amendment 
but was, rather, “a matter of judicial implication.”11  That in itself was not 
so damaging; a great deal of constitutional law is a matter of judicial impli-
cation, and the first part of the Amendment, which declares the right that 
the Amendment protects, is, after all, an extraordinarily compressed state-
ment of abstract principle.  Frankfurter went on at length, however, to de-
precate the value of exclusion and to suggest strongly that the right and the 
remedy were separate.  On the other hand, focusing on the issue of incorpo-
ration, he said also that “the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary in-
trusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is 
. . . implicit in ‘the concept of ordered liberty’ and as such enforceable 
against the States through the Due Process Clause.”12  One might have 
found some room to argue that if a state were systematically to deny any 
effective remedy for violation of the right, that would be “affirmatively to 
sanction such police incursion into privacy,” and, so doing, “would run 
counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment.”13  Then what? 
A mere five years later, there was another turn of the screw.  In Irvine v. 
California, another state case, police secretly entered the defendant’s house 
on several occasions to install a microphone, listened to conversations in 
the house for more than a month, and then entered the house to arrest the 
 
 8. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914). 
 9. See id. at 395-96. 
 10. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 11. Id. at 28. 
 12. Id. at 27-28. 
 13. Id. at 28. 
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defendant and searched without a warrant.14  A majority of the Court, fol-
lowing Wolf, concluded that although the conduct of the police was fla-
grantly unlawful, the admission of evidence so obtained did not violate the 
Due Process Clause, and it need not be excluded.  Frankfurter, however, 
disagreed. Putting Wolf aside, he asserted that Rochin v. California,15 
another opinion that he had authored two years earlier, dictated that the 
evidence be excluded because the manner by which it was obtained “of-
fend[s] elementary standards of justice.”16  Irvine was in truth a skirmish in 
the larger battle over incorporation of the whole Bill of Rights into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a battle Frankfurter and Jus-
tice Black were then waging,17 with the other Justices mostly standing on 
the sidelines.  Although the exclusionary rule itself was not involved, Ir-
vine, following Wolf, considerably muddled matters.  For there was Frank-
furter, in dissent, arguing that the evidence should, indeed, have been ex-
cluded. 
And then there is Mapp.  It was itself an odd case, hardly likely to make 
much of a stir.  The Court heard Mapp’s appeal to consider a First 
Amendment issue.18  The evidentiary issue was not raised in Mapp’s brief, 
and when her attorney was asked at oral argument if he was asking the 
Court to overrule Wolf, he said that he had never heard of the case.19  The 
American Civil Liberties Union, in its brief as amicus, raised the eviden-
tiary issue in passing.  If  the due process rationale that Frankfurter had 
stated in Rochin was good law, Mapp was an obvious case for its applica-
tion; the unlawful conduct of the police, described in detail in Justice 
Clark’s opinion for the Court, was prolonged, included physical abuse, as 
in Rochin,20 and, evidently, knowingly unlawful.  But Justice Clark had in-
dicated his disapproval of that “ad hoc” approach in a concurring opinion 
 
 14. 347 U.S. 128, 131 (1954). 
 15. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 16. Irvine, 347 U.S. at 148 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  Rochin had established the so-
called “shock the conscience” test, to the effect that evidence obtained by police conduct so 
egregious that it shocked the conscience was to be excluded as a matter of due process, 
without regard to the Fourth Amendment. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. 
 17. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168-74 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), 174-77 (Black, J., con-
curring); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), 68 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
 18. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development 
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 
1367 (1983). 
 19. Id. 
 20. In Irvine, the reason given by Justice Jackson with the concurrence of three other 
Justices for not applying Rochin was that, however “obnoxious” the police conduct in the 
latter case, it did not involve physical abuse.  Irvine, 347 U.S. at 133. 
WEINREB_CHRISTENSEN2 6/13/2010  8:44 PM 
2010] THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE REDUX—AGAIN 877 
in Irvine,21 and the assignment of the majority opinion to him made it un-
likely that Rochin would be followed.  In fact, when the opinion was as-
signed to Clark, it was understood that the Court would reverse Mapp’s 
conviction on the basis of the First Amendment argument.  Clark later ob-
tained the agreement of a majority to overrule Wolf.22 
Clark referred to cases describing the Weeks exclusionary rule as a part 
of the constitutional right, but at the same time he emphasized its deterrent 
function.  It was, he said, “a clear, specific, and constitutionally required—
even if judicially implied—deterrent safeguard without insistence upon 
which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to ‘a form of 
words.’”23  Twice declaring that it was not “basically relevant,”24 he consi-
dered the States’ experience since Wolf at some length.  Then, reverting to 
the rights-based approach, he observed that not to exclude evidence unlaw-
fully seized “is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and 
enjoyment.”25  Reading Clark’s opinion, one could be sure that Wolf had 
been overruled, but whether because the Fourth Amendment required it or 
on empirically validated utilitarian grounds was impossible to say. 
The matter was not made easier by three concurring or dissenting opi-
nions,26 variously endorsed by six of the nine Justices.  Justice Black, never 
a fan of the Fourth Amendment, concurred.  He said that in his view “the 
federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but 
is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate.”27  
But, he said, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments considered together re-
quired the exclusionary rule.28  Justice Douglas, concurring, evoked Weeks, 
saying that the exclusion of evidence unlawfully seized was required lest 
the right itself be “‘a dead letter.’”29  Justice Harlan, after objecting to the 
 
 21. Id. at 138 (Clark, J., concurring). 
 22. Stewart, supra note 18, at 1368. 
 23. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. Unit-
ed States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)). 
 24. Id. at 651, 653. 
 25. Id. at 656. 
 26. There was also a brief memorandum by Justice Stewart declining to express any 
view on the merits because he thought that the matter was not properly before the Court.  Id. 
at 672 (Stewart, J., mem.). 
 27. Id. at 661 (Black, J., concurring).  Justice Douglas concurred.  He also joined the 
opinion of the Court and wrote a concurring opinion of his own. Id. at 666 (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
 28. Id. at 662.  So far as I am aware, except for Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Irvine, 
no other Justice has endorsed Black’s explanation of the exclusionary rule.  Black rejected 
Rochin’s shock-the-conscience test altogether. 
 29. Id. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting)). 
WEINREB_CHRISTENSEN2 6/13/2010  8:44 PM 
878 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
Court’s consideration of the issue without briefs or oral argument,30 re-
jected the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment into the Due Process 
Clause and left it at that.31  Noting that Wolf had been decided only twelve 
years before, with the concurrence of three of the five Justices who now 
composed the majority in Mapp, he observed with unintended irony: “It 
certainly has never been a postulate of judicial power that mere altered dis-
position, or subsequent membership on the Court, is sufficient warrant for 
overturning a deliberately decided rule of Constitutional law.”32 
A good deal of the ambivalence and confusion that surrounded the ex-
clusionary rule during the dozen years between Wolf and Mapp is explained 
by the debate over incorporation, which raised larger issues.  After Frank-
furter retired in 1962, the Court quickly embraced Black’s view favoring 
incorporation, in Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963.33  Thereafter, for the rest 
of the decade, in a series of cases the Court incorporated all but two of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights having to do with criminal cases.34  (The 
interment of Frankfurter’s anti-incorporation view made the “shock the 
conscience” test that he had championed in Rochin and Irvine moribund as 
well.  After Mapp, the raison d’être of that test—to justify the exclusion of 
evidence without an exclusionary rule—was gone.)  Frankfurter had won 
the battles over incorporation, but Black won the war.  The exclusionary 
rule provided the jurisdictional basis for the Court’s intervention in cases 
involving police practices and was not generally questioned.  Then, starting 
with United States v. Calandra35 in 1974, a new majority on the Court 
looked with less favor on the rule.  It downplayed the rule’s rights-based 
 
 30. Id. at 676-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 678-86. 
 32. Id. at 677. 
 33. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  Black, who wrote the opinion for the Court, was careful to 
state the underlying rationale of the extension of the right to counsel to state cases ambi-
guously, in a manner that those who did not subscribe to incorporation might accept. 
 34. See, in chronological order, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of 
witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) 
(jury trial); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy).  The right to a pub-
lic trial and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments had been “absorbed” into 
the Due Process Clause earlier. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and un-
usual punishments); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (public trial).  The two provisions 
that have not been incorporated are the grand jury provision in the Fifth Amendment and the 
bail provision in the Eighth Amendment.  It is generally presumed that the latter is, in fact, 
incorporated, although the Court has not quite said so. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 
137, 144 n.3 (1979); Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 35. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
WEINREB_CHRISTENSEN2 6/13/2010  8:44 PM 
2010] THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE REDUX—AGAIN 879 
justification and emphasized its deterrent aspect, which has remained the 
dominant view ever since. 
If incorporation was the éminence grise in the debate over the exclusio-
nary rule in the 1950s, the so-called revolution in criminal process played 
that role in the succeeding decade, and the so-called counter-revolution in 
the decades since.  In some ways, the exclusionary rule was an accidental 
hostage to larger forces: first the Court’s determination to address the gross 
failure of the States’ supervision of their own police practices, which the 
decline of federalism in the wake of the Depression, the New Deal, and 
World War II had made intolerable, and later, the reaction to what was per-
ceived as excessive unrest and lawlessness, engendered by the empower-
ment of newly assertive social groups and opposition to the war in Viet-
nam.  Those forces played out on a larger stage than the Court could readily 
occupy.  The admission or not of evidence, on the other hand, was some-
thing that courts did all the time, for which they were plainly well-suited.  
In that context, the exclusionary rule’s history is comprehensible, even if its 
rationale is obscure. 
There is very little that is truly novel in Hudson v. Michigan36 or Her-
ring v. United States.37  The opinions in both cases trot out familiar argu-
ments wrapped in familiar rhetoric and manipulate them in familiar ways.  
Still, they are not just the “same old, same old,” and they merit our atten-
tion.  In Hudson, the majority opinion by Justice Scalia offered two reasons 
why evidence seized in the defendant’s house need not be excluded, even 
though the police entered the house without complying with the “knock-
and-announce” requirement, which made the entry and the search of the 
house unlawful.38  The first reason referred to the statement in Wong Sun v. 
United States, decided two years after Mapp, that even if one could trace a 
causal line from unlawful police conduct to the seizure of evidence, the 
“taint” of the illegality might be so “attenuated” that the evidence need not 
be excluded.39  There was nothing new or startling about the proposition 
that the chain of “but for” causes linking the illegality and the evidence 
might simply be too long for the former to count as the cause of the latter.  
It reflects ordinary speech about the causal relation generally; at some 
point, we stop referring to one event as the cause of another and refer in-
 
 36. 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 37. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
 38. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 588-602. 
 39. 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963) (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 
(1939) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  There was an indication in the Court’s opinion 
that a typical case in which the taint is not attenuated or “dissipated” is one in which the po-
lice “exploited” the illegality. Id. at 487. 
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stead to an event closer in time and circumstance to the latter.  That under-
standing would have been part of the inquiry dictated by the exclusionary 
rule whether or not it was stated explicitly, simply as part of what we mean 
by causal connection.  Like causation generally, it is a matter of fact, albeit 
difficult to pin down, and not subject to empirical verification.  The notion 
of attenuation was applied after Wong Sun, but necessarily ad hoc.  During 
periods when Fourth Amendment interests were favored or before a favor-
ably disposed judge, the taint of illegality might persist a little longer; when 
Fourth Amendment interests were in decline or before an unfavorably dis-
posed judge, the taint was attenuated more quickly.  The issue was general-
ly resolved at the trial level and left there. 
In Hudson, Justice Scalia took the notion of attenuation in a new direc-
tion, saying that however close the causal link, the taint of illegality is atte-
nuated if suppression would not serve “the interest protected by the consti-
tutional guarantee that has been violated.”40  I do not think that the 
language of Wong Sun, on which Justice Scalia draws, easily bears that 
construction.41  But that aside, it is at least not obvious that an unlawful act 
of the police should be disassembled into its component parts and the inter-
est protected by each part considered in isolation from the rest.  The search 
that turned up evidence against Hudson was initiated by an unlawful entry.  
Why is that not enough?  The additional requirement that Justice Scalia 
imposes has no apparent relevance to any of the general purposes usually 
asserted for the exclusionary rule: to vindicate the right that the unlawful 
police conduct infringed, to avoid compromising the integrity of the trial 
court—both purposes that Justice Scalia does not care much about in any 
event—and to deter similar unlawful conduct in the future—in Scalia’s 
view, the only purpose.42  Bare statement of the exclusionary rule perhaps 
permits the construction that Justice Scalia gives it, but the only justifica-
tion for doing so is to confine the rule as narrowly as possible.43 
The second, independent reason given for not applying the exclusionary 
rule is that the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits.44  This is thoroughly 
plowed ground, and the harvest in Hudson contains little that is new.  As a 
rule, when the Court concludes that evidence should be excluded, it adopts 
 
 40. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593. 
 41. The point that Justice Scalia makes is related to, but not the same as, the rule that 
evidence obtained unlawfully need not be excluded if the police would inevitably have dis-
covered it anyway.  See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 432 (1984). 
 42. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594-99. 
 43. Justice Scalia cited three cases as precedents.  Justice Kennedy, who provided the 
majority’s fifth vote, pointedly expressed his disagreement about two of them. Id. at 602, 
604 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 44. See id. at 594-600. 
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the rhetoric of rights and emphasizes the injury to the defendant.45  If, as in 
Hudson, it concludes that evidence should not be excluded, it adopts the 
rhetoric of utility and emphasizes the rule’s deterrent function.46  The ful-
lest exploration of both positions is the debate between Justice White for 
the Court and Justice Brennan, dissenting, in United States v. Leon,47 in 
which the Court established the so-called good-faith exception to the rule.  
If exclusion’s only function is to deter police misconduct, the exception 
makes sense.  In Leon, the police had investigated extensively and on the 
basis of their investigation had obtained a search warrant, which was later 
invalidated for lack of probable cause.48  Their conduct, albeit mistaken, 
was not just lawful, it was exemplary; there was nothing to deter.  Leon’s 
rights under the Fourth Amendment had been violated and admitting the 
evidence might seem as though the Court were letting the government (se-
rendipitously, to be sure) take advantage of the violation.  But again, if de-
terrence is all that counts, that might not matter.  That utilitarian perspec-
tive had been prominent in some earlier opinions involving another stage in 
the criminal process49 or a noncriminal proceeding,50 but Leon was the first 
case in which it was applied to the admission of evidence as part of the 
prosecution’s case in a criminal trial.51  The Court’s opinion in Leon eli-
cited a lengthy dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan which remains the 
strongest and clearest statement of the rights-based approach.52  He empha-
sized the integral relationship between the police and the prosecutor, who 
together assemble the case against a defendant, and the courts, which de-
termine his guilt.  Justice Brennan rejected the view that “the substantive 
 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (“In this case, important 
Fourth Amendment privacy interests were at stake.”). 
 46. E.g., Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (“The exclusionary rule generates ‘substantial social 
costs,’ which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large.”) (quot-
ing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)); Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 (“The substan-
tial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule . . . have long been a source of concern.”). 
 47. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 48. Id. at 901-03. 
 49. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (habeas corpus proceeding); United States 
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury proceeding).  It had also been used to justify a 
strict requirement of standing that allowed a defendant to move to suppress evidence only if 
he were the person whose rights had been violated. E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 
(1978). 
 50. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (civil tax proceeding). 
 51. The Court had previously allowed the prosecution to use unlawfully seized evidence 
only to impeach a defendant’s own testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 
620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).  That exception to the exclusio-
nary rule did not extend to the testimony of a defense witness other than the defendant. 
James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990). 
 52. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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protections of the Fourth Amendment are wholly exhausted at the moment 
when police unlawfully invade an individual’s privacy and thus no substan-
tive force remains to those protections at the time of trial when the gov-
ernment seeks to use evidence obtained by the police.”53  With respect to 
the deterrence argument itself, Brennan questioned the majority’s assess-
ment of the costs and benefits of exclusion but also challenged the cost-
benefit accounting more broadly: 
By remaining within its redoubt of empiricism and by basing the rule 
solely on the deterrence rationale, the Court has robbed the rule of legiti-
macy.  A doctrine that is explained as if it were an empirical proposition 
but for which there is only limited empirical support is both inherently 
unstable and an easy mark for critics.54 
It is difficult to quarrel with that conclusion.  But unless one subscribes 
to Brennan’s view of the purposes of the exclusionary rule, his own state-
ment might be read as a preface to abandoning it.  Brennan understood that.  
He foresaw that Leon, not very significant in itself because it was limited to 
the relatively rare case of a search on a warrant, would be extended to war-
rantless searches as well, and he speculated that the majority was bent on 
overturning the exclusionary rule altogether.55  That has not happened, but 
the decisions in Hudson and Herring come close. 
Justice Scalia’s description in Hudson of the costs and benefits of exclu-
sion supports Brennan’s skeptical view of that approach.  Scalia waxes elo-
quent about the costs.  There is “always,” he says, “the grave adverse con-
sequence” of “the risk of releasing dangerous criminals into society.”56  
And beyond that, he says, applying the rule to failures to knock and an-
nounce would generate a “constant flood” of motions to suppress; because 
of the indeterminacy of the knock-and-announce requirement, “[c]ourts 
would experience as never before”57 the need for extensive litigation to re-
solve the question of exclusion.  Furthermore, officers making an arrest and 
wanting to comply with the law (or, at any rate to avoid exclusion) would 
wait longer than necessary, which would “produc[e] preventable violence 
against officers in some cases, and the destruction of evidence in many oth-
ers.”58  He is much more dubious about the possible benefits.  An officer, 
 
 53. Id. at 935.  Justice Brennan had written in a similar vein in a dissenting opinion in 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 (1974). 
 54. Leon, 468 U.S. at 943 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 928-29, 959.  He made a similar speculation in Calandra. 414 U.S. at 365 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 56. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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he says, has no incentive whatever to violate the knock-and-announce re-
quirement—he can expect to achieve “absolutely nothing”—except to pre-
vent the destruction of evidence and avoid “life-threatening resistance by 
occupants,”59 a reasonable suspicion of which suspends the requirement 
anyway.  If a deterrent is needed, the possibility of a civil action against the 
offending officer is available: “As far as we know, civil liability is an effec-
tive deterrent here.”60  In addition, “the increasing professionalism of po-
lice forces,” “a new emphasis on internal police discipline,” and “increas-
ing use of various forms of citizen review” reduce the need for an external 
deterrent.61  In sum, the available deterrents to knock-and-announce viola-
tions are “incomparably greater”62 than they were when Mapp was decided.  
Aside from citations to a few books describing police administration in 
general terms, Justice Scalia’s assertions are supported only by quotations 
selected from the Court’s own prior statements. 
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion is not much better.  He gives the 
knock-and-announce requirement a larger place in the rights protected by 
the Fourth Amendment than Justice Scalia does.  So far as the exclusionary 
rule is concerned, however, he accepts the premise that its “driving legal 
purpose” is deterrence.63  But aside from noting that cases reporting knock-
and-announce violations are “legion,”64 he offers little affirmative evidence 
that stringent application of the exclusionary rule would make much differ-
ence.  (The reported cases were presumably decided when the rule was, or 
was thought to be, applicable.)  He too relies mainly on selected quotations 
from the Court’s opinions. 
Writing only for himself, in a short concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy 
takes the position, evocative of Wolf, that the knock-and-announce rule is 
“linked to ancient principles in our constitutional order” and that it is a “se-
rious matter” when police disregard it, but that “suppression is another mat-
ter.”65  Suppression is not appropriate in this instance, he concludes, be-
cause the failure to knock and announce “cannot properly be described as 
having caused the discovery of evidence.”66  Although this brief statement 
refers only to the causal connection between the illegality and the seizure 
of evidence, the summary dismissal of such a connection evidently is 
 
 59. Id. at 596. 
 60. Id. at 598. 
 61. Id. at 598-99. 
 62. Id. at 599. 
 63. Id. at 608 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 604. 
 64. Id. at 610. 
 65. Id. at 602, 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 66. Id. at 604. 
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aligned with Scalia’s disassembly of the requirements of a lawful search 
into its component parts and their distinct purposes.  Kennedy’s vote was 
necessary to the outcome.  The reservations and doubts that he expresses 
about the reasoning, if not the result, of the majority opinion make Hudson 
a frail augury of the exclusionary rule’s future course.  All the same, for 
four Justices and perhaps for five, Hudson signals a determination to con-
tinue whacking the rule by a combination of logic-chopping, dubious asser-
tions of fact, selective precedents, and high-sounding but, in the event, 
empty rhetoric. 
Herring continues more forcefully and directly along the same path.  In 
itself, the case is not very significant.  Herring was arrested on the basis of 
an error in police records.67  Although there is abundant anecdotal evidence 
that police record-keeping is not all that it might be, neither the majority 
nor the dissenting opinion gives any indication of how often an inaccurate 
police record leads to an invalid arrest that turns up evidence necessary for 
a conviction.  Since the arrest is not valid, the discovery of evidence is pre-
sumably serendipitous.  It is just worth noting, however, that it was not en-
tirely serendipitous in this case: the officer who initiated the records check 
was involved in a personal dispute with Herring and hoped that the records 
would give him a basis to make an arrest and, therefore, search Herring and 
his truck.68 
The reason for our interest in the case has to do not with its particular 
facts but with the generalities that the facts provoked.  Chief Justice Ro-
berts’s opinion disposes of the prior debate about the underpinnings of the 
exclusionary rule in a few brief sentences, indicating that for him and the 
four concurring Justices, the debate is effectively over.  Exclusion, he says, 
is “not an individual right” and is appropriate only if it “result[s] in appre-
ciable deterrence.”69  Furthermore, the fact that there will, or may be, some 
deterrent effect is not enough; the benefit of exclusion must outweigh the 
cost.  And benefits and costs should be considered both in gross—in cases 
of that kind—and in detail—in the particular case.70 
The calculation of costs and benefits is eerily general and consists most-
ly of references to the facts of other cases and what the Court itself said 
about them.  Pretermitting inquiry whether a defendant might have been, or 
might be, convicted anyway, it observes that “the principal cost . . . is, of 
 
 67. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009). 
 68. Id. at 705 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. at 700 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
 70. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1987)). 
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course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free.”71  As for 
benefit, the Court observes, reasonably enough, that the threat of exclusion 
has the most deterrent effect when the conduct of the police is deliberate 
and flagrantly unlawful, and the least—if any—when police believe that 
their conduct is lawful.72  On their own terms, such calculations are unex-
ceptionable; a threat deters someone only if he is aware that the threat is di-
rected at him.  But they wash out of consideration what, in the context of 
police work, is likely to be the more common situation.  Not least because 
the Court itself has had such a difficult time explaining and clarifying 
Fourth Amendment law, and also because police administrators and local 
officials characteristically emphasize the value of arresting offenders and 
depreciate the value of protecting their rights, officers must often find 
themselves thinking that conduct that they contemplate is probably but not 
certainly all right, or that it is probably but not certainly not all right.  If the 
exclusion of evidence is a deterrent at all, one would expect that, forcefully 
applied, it would have an effect in many such cases. 
The large change that Herring makes is that it applies the calculation of 
costs and benefits not only to the type of case before it but also to the spe-
cific, concrete facts.  Leon, it is true, had required courts to consider the 
specific facts of a case, but only with respect to the officer’s good faith, and 
even then, only if good faith was clearly indicated because the officer had 
obtained a search warrant.73  Herring goes a great deal further.  Even in the 
absence of good faith, a court is directed to calculate the costs and benefits 
of exclusion, with a strong suggestion that the benefits are likely to prevail 
only if the officer(s) are found to have acted knowingly and deliberately in 
violation of the law.  A trial judge following that lead, and having to decide 
whether to exclude evidence probative of guilt, will find it easy to weigh 
the immediate and direct cost of exclusion (eminently including the risk 
that a “guilty and possibly dangerous” defendant will go free74) more 
heavily than the speculative and indirect benefit of better police behavior 
thereafter, a factual determination easy to affirm on appeal.  If, as the Court 
evidently anticipates, evidence is excluded less often, that will, of course, 
reduce the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule further. 
So where are we?  Justice Brennan’s dire prediction in Leon, that the 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would be extended to war-
rantless searches, has been fulfilled, although not in just the way that he an-
ticipated.  Whether an officer has obtained a warrant or not, so long as 
 
 71. Id. at 701. 
 72. Id. at 701-02. 
 73. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54. 
 74. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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there is not strong evidence that his conduct was deliberate or reckless, the 
calculation of the costs and benefits of exclusion along the lines indicated 
in Herring will give a trial judge cover for the admission of probative evi-
dence, which is likely to be his individual preference anyway.  Taking a 
longer view, the law is roughly where it was under the rules of Wolf and 
Rochin, as Frankfurter, author of both opinions, understood them.  Exclu-
sion is not automatic but is reserved for evidence obtained by police con-
duct that is sufficiently “shocking” and out of the ordinary to call for a re-
sponse.75 
Is that an appropriate outcome after fifty or a hundred years of mulling 
the matter over?  I doubt that there is anything more that can usefully be 
said about the abstract question whether the exclusionary rule is an integral 
part of the Fourth Amendment right or is rather a collateral issue affected 
by utilitarian considerations.  It is, at any rate, certain that nothing can be 
said that will for the present affect the course of decisions.  Abstractly, 
there are no rules that prescribe generally when and how an act is separated 
from its consequences.  Concretely, the police practices that are gathered 
under the rubric “search and seizure” are certainly more respectful of indi-
viduals’ rights today than they were when Wolf was decided, although just 
as certainly we are not as well off as Justice Scalia speculated we are in 
Hudson.  If, on one hand, preservation of the rule means that a criminal 
sometimes goes free, its abandonment, on the other hand, would disconnect 
the Fourth Amendment from its most visible practical protection. 
Whichever of the asserted purposes of the exclusionary rule one favors, 
the current state of affairs is regrettable.  The Court’s repeated downplay-
ing of the rule and unwillingness to apply it as a remedy for a concrete vi-
olation of rights has the effect of making the rights themselves seem less 
urgent and in some, probably considerable, measure implicates the courts 
in their violation.  That, in turn, reduces the deterrent effect of the rule.  
There is reason to believe that during the 1960s, when the courts not only 
applied the rule but championed it, local police departments and individual 
officers regarded respect for individual rights as a mark of a professional 
police officer.76  The message that the courts, especially the Supreme 
Court, communicate now is quite different.  On the rare occasions when 
evidence is excluded, it is done grudgingly and treated as an unwelcome 
and unhelpful interference with the police “who were only trying to do 
their job.”  We know very little about how law, constitutional decisions of 
the Supreme Court in particular, is heard and enters the lives of ordinary 
 
 75. See supra note 16. 
 76. See, e.g., Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and 
Seizure, 49 UMKC L. REV. 24, 28-30 (1980). 
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people.  But there is little reason to doubt that the Court’s own attitude is 
reflected outside the courtroom and picked up, especially by those whose 
conduct is in question. 
So also, the fact that the exclusionary rule is typically applied long after 
the allegedly illegal police conduct occurred, in the course of an adversarial 
proceeding in which there is a winner and a loser and either the police of-
ficer or the defendant will look like a “mug,” deprives the rule of much of 
its normative force.  At a suppression hearing, the facts have hardened into 
the case for the prosecution and the case for the defense and have become 
remote from the facts on the ground.  It should not surprise us that police 
officers are detached from the inquiry and see the exclusion of evidence not 
as a direct commentary on, and consequence of, their own conduct but, 
again, as unwelcome interference from without.  In recent years, the Su-
preme Court’s rhetoric, occasional flights of eloquence in praise of the 
Fourth Amendment notwithstanding, has done little to counteract this per-
ception of the police and much to confirm it.  Whether the rule, convincing-
ly enforced and approved by the courts as well as local political leaders and 
chiefs of police, would be an effective deterrent to violations of individu-
als’ rights is something we know very little about. 
Where is the rule headed?  One of the more puzzling aspects of the ex-
clusionary rule’s history has been its tenacity.  For some years now, a plu-
rality, and possibly a majority, of the Justices have generally disfavored the 
rule.  It has been opposed by the Department of Justice.77  Bills have been 
introduced in Congress to overturn it.78  I doubt that the rule is so fixed in 
our consciousness as to be invulnerable.79  It is not part of the script of in-
numerable television shows, like Miranda v. Arizona.80  In view of all that 
the Court has said, especially clearly in Hudson and Herring, it would be a 
simple matter for the Court to abandon the rule, reserving exclusion for ex-
ceptional cases of flagrant lawlessness, “in the interest of justice.”  That 
would take us back to the situation in state courts before Mapp, while the 
“shock the conscience” test was still viable.  One might see Herring as a 
 
 77. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL ON THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE (1986), reprinted in 22 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 573 (1989). 
 78. E.g., Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1989, H.R. 3918, 101st Cong. § 301 (2d 
Sess. 1989); Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1995, S. 54, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1995).  
If it is only one deterrent among others, such action by Congress would not raise a constitu-
tional issue. 
 79. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (discussing the preceden-
tial weight of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). 
 80. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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harbinger of that development.  Indeed, as I have said, I think that is in sub-
stance, if not in form, where we are now. 
Nevertheless, I doubt that will happen.  The exclusionary rule is the key 
to the Court’s jurisdiction over federal and, more important, state criminal 
proceedings.  Unless there is some plausible claim that evidence should 
have been excluded under the Fourth or Fifth or Sixth Amendment, there is 
generally no basis for the Court to hear a criminal case.  I do not think the 
Court will deprive itself of jurisdiction over so large an area, a jurisdiction, 
moreover, that it evidently enjoys exercising.  Instead, I expect the Court to 
retain the rule, letting it limp along ineffectively, regularly dismissing it 
and on rare occasions applying it, just often enough to call for another 
symposium. 
